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ABSTRACT
Using the firm level panel data, obtained from the period between during , this study shows that the
failing firms, accepted in the court-administered rehabilitation procedures after the post-crisis
bankruptcy reform in Korea, had experienced less persistent problems in the pre-bankruptcy Total-
Factor-Productivity (TFP) performances than those before the reform. The most crucial element of
the post-crisis reform in the post-crisis court-administered bankruptcy system is the implementation
of an economic efficiency criterion, whereas the pre-reform system benefited failing firms deemed
as having high social value and prospects for rehabilitation. The new system removes the
possibilities for interested parties to oppose the exit of the firms without economic values. Then,
to get an idea of how the bankruptcy policy reform would affect the performance of aggregate TFP,
we assess the role of the creative destruction process of entry and exit in total factor productivity
growth utilizing plant level panel data in the Korean manufacturing sector during the 1990-98
period. For this purpose, we document the plant entry and exit rates, examine the dynamic
relationship between plant turnovers and plant productivity, and quantify the contribution from
entry and exit to productivity growth. We conclude that, for sustained total factor productivity
growth, it is important to establish policy or institutional environment where efficient businesses
succeed and inefficient businesses fail.
Youngjae Lim
Korea Development Institute









During the onset of the Korean financial crisis in 1997, an inefficient corporate 
bankruptcy system had  a detrimental affect on Korea’s economy. Prior to the crisis, in 1996 
and the first three-quarters of 1997,  a number of large firms  facing  bankruptcy actively 
sought shelter under  the  court-administered rehabilitation procedures.  However, the 
inadequacies of the bankruptcy system failed to maintain  discipline in targeting appropriate 
firms  to undergo the  rehabilitation procedure among the increasingly large number of 
financially distressed firms. Meanwhile,  before the outbreak of the economic crisis,  the 
uncertainty and delay encountered in dealing with failing firms clearly added to the distortion 
of the resource allocation process in Korea’s economy.   
In other words, the exit barriers for large firms seemed to have deteriorated the 
efficiency of resource allocation before the onset of the  crisis.  Prior to the crisis,  Korea’s 
corporate bankruptcy system had a tendency to work as a de facto exit barrier. For example, 
before the reform, producers with persistently declining productivity were more likely to be 
accepted in some rehabilitation procedure if they were deemed  as having “high social value” 
such as a large output or employment share in the economy.   
Hence,  the  natural  course of action  for  post-crisis Korea  was  to  undertake  a   3
sweeping reform of its corporate bankruptcy system. As the case with other structural reforms 
in the corporate sector,  reforming Korea’s bankruptcy policy was pushed forward based on 
the belief that  new reforms were essential  in preventing recurrent economic  crises from   
plaguing the economy. Yet, the past experiences of crisis-hit countries suggest that there is a 
strong possibility  that incomplete or  weak reforms  will often lead to recurrent  economic 
crises. Despite the suggestion, to the best of our knowledge, there are few empirical studies to 
examine how bankruptcy reforms in the post-crisis Korea affect the efficiency of resource re-
allocation and, ultimately, the total factor productivity (TFP) growth in Korea’s economy.
1 
Against this backdrop, our study aims to address the issue of evaluating the effect s 
of bankruptcy policy reform by analyzing micro data on the firm or plant level.    First, by 
employing the firm-level panel data, the study will examine how the post-crisis reforms in the 
bankruptcy policy affect the productivity dynamics of failing firms. In the analysis, we will 
focus on  bankruptcy procedures administered by the courts. For example, failing firms faced 
with bankruptcy that are unsuccessful in securing an out-of-court settlement after exhausting 
                                                                   
1 There are some recent studies that begin by examining the determinants of the divergent growth path of crisis-
hit countries and (simply) suggest that such policies as bankruptcy policy reform, are possibly the candidates.  
However, they do not analyze the effect of bankruptcy policy reform on the resource re-allocation process of the 
economy based on the details of institutions at the micro level. For instance, Hayashi and Prescott (2000) show 
the 1990's of the Japanese economy is the failure to improve productivity not the failure to accumulate inputs. 
Based on this finding and other evidence, they further suggest that the industrial policy of protecting failing or 
declining industries or firms by the Japanese government is the main culprit behind the "lost decade". 
Meanwhile, in a comparative study of Chile and Mexico, Bergoeing, Kehoe, Kehoe, and Soto (2001) show that 
the decade-long divergent growth paths of the two countries since the financial crisis in the early 1980's are 
predominantly driven by the differences in total factor productivity growth rates. They suggest that policies such 
as the bankruptcy policy reform, are candidates for explaining the different paths of the two countries.   4
all options would have to  settle for an  in-court settlement. Maintaining discipline in  in-court 
bankruptcy  procedures would have far-reaching consequences on  out-of-court bankruptcy 
procedures, because the discipline would act as an effective and credible deterrent to failing 
firms in other stages. 
We examine whether the firms accepted  under  the  reformed court-administered 
rehabilitation procedures would experience less persistent problems in their  pre-bankruptcy 
TFP compared with firms undergoing  the process before the reforms. We expect that, if the 
reform  in  the  in-court bankruptcy procedures is successful,  then only  the  firms  with 
temporary difficulties  would be accepted by  the  rehabilitation  programs, whereas failing 
firms with persistently declining productivity  would be rejected. Successful reform of the 
corporate bankruptcy system would imply an improvement in the efficiency of resource re-
allocation. 
Secondly, to formulate an idea of how bankruptcy policy reform would contribute to 
preventing prolonged economic stagnation, we will examine how the reforms would improve 
the efficiency of resource re-allocation and, in turn, aggregate TFP growth. 
Over the past years, there have been studies documenting that  the resource  re-
allocation process from exiting producers to entering producers explains a substantial portion 
of TFP changes at the aggregate level. Most of the studies find that exiting producers exhibit   5
persistently declining productivity while entering producers that survive the market selection 
process exhibit rapidly increasing productivity (Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan 1998, Hahn 
2000, etc). This pattern suggests that policies that prevent the  efficient reallocation of 
resources via entry and exit could be potentially very costly with the cost  possibly growing 
over time. On the contrary, the reforms of bankruptcy policy, which induce inefficient firms 
to exit with a lower cost and allocate released resources to efficient entrants or incumbents, 
would enhance the rate of aggregate productivity growth. 
In this study, we will ask whether this productivity dynamics of entering and exiting 
producers holds in Ko rea, b y using  the plant-level panel data on the Korean manufacturing 
sector. Specifically, we will examine the following questions. What kinds of time profiles do 
the TFPs of exiting and entering producers show? Given the pattern of productivity dynamics, 
how does the competitive process of entry and exit improve aggregate productivity? Can we 
expect the policies that improve the efficiency of resource re-allocation, such as bankruptcy 
policy reform, to improve aggregate TFP instantaneously or over a period of time? 
The broad outline of this study is as follows. In section 2, we examine the effects of 
the post-crisis bankruptcy policy reform in Korea on the resource re-allocation process using 
the  firm-level data. For this  objective, we discuss the key elements  in  the  post-crisis 
bankruptcy reforms and then proceed to analyze the TFP performance of failing firms   6
entering  the court-administered rehabilitation procedures before and after the reform. In 
section 3, we examine the mechanism by which the reform would improve the efficiency of 
resource re-allocation or the performance of aggregate TFP,  by using the  plant-level panel 
data on the Korean manufacturing sector,. In section 4, we summarize and conclude this study. 
II. Bankruptcy Policy Reform and the Productivity 
Dynamics of Failing Firms 
2.1 Corporate Bankruptcy System prior to the Economic Crisis 
< Exit Barriers for Large Firms > 
In Korea, economic growth in the past  was possible through the growth or 
restructuring of existing firms rather than through the dynamic process of entry and exit. In 
the  period of  development when profitable new markets were rapidly emerging, the 
inadequate corporate bankruptcy system did not significantly distort the resource allocation 
of the economy  due to the ability  of the economy to easily re-allocate  resources  from 
declining sectors to emerging profitable sectors. Under these circumstances, through 
rationalization programs, the government played an active role in re-allocating resources 
from failing firms to other existing firms. During the developmental  period,  many of the   7
failing firms were not filing for bankruptcy procedures overseen by the courts.
2   
In particular, m ost  small and medium-sized  bankrupt firms were effectively 
liquidated on a non-judicial basis.  A bankrupt firm’s debt was usually collected on an 
individual basis under the Civil Procedure Act. Most  of the bankrupt firm’s assets were 
already subject to mortgage or security, consequently, leaving little for unsecured creditors. 
Additional procedures for the collection of debt were not necessary.   
For large firms, however, the ‘too big to fail’ argument played a part in building exit 
barriers in the sense that inefficient firms were often allowed to operate through some explicit 
or hidden subsidies from the government.  Several large  sized bankrupt firms were 
periodically bailed out  through the government’s  various “rationalization” measures, 
undercutting Korea’s formal bankruptcy procedures. 
Since the early 1990s, however,  Korea’s inadequate corporate bankruptcy system 
began to distort  the  economy’s  resource allocation, which   increasingly  grew  until the 
outbreak of the financial crisis in 1997. Since the early 1990s, some failing firms began  to 
enter court-administered bankruptcy procedures, but the bankruptcy system was often abused 
by controlling shareholders of the failing firms. 
                                                                   
2 One technical hurdle to enforcing judicial bankruptcy procedures was the Act on Special Measures for Unpaid 
Loans of Financial Institutions. The act gave the Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) the authority 
to hold auctions of the bankrupt firm’s assets before the initiation of court procedures. The act basically nullified 
the Corporate Reorganization Act since the auction of assets by KAMCO effectively preempted the corporate 
reorganization process. In 1990, the Constitutional Court declared this provision unconstitutional, paving the 
way for the expanded use of judicial bankruptcy procedures.   8
By enacting the Rule on Corporate Reorganization Procedure in 1992, the Supreme 
Court began to shift towards improving judicial bankruptcy procedures. In particular, the new 
rule established conditions for initiating corporate reorganization proceedings. The conditions 
established by the new rule included  firms which exhibited  high social value, financial 
distress, and potential for rehabilitation; interestingly however, economic efficiency was not a 
condition for corporate reorganization. The new rule  tended to  give preference to  larger 
failing firms for in-court corporate bankruptcy settlements creating a de facto exit barrier for 
large firms. For example, producers with persistently declining productivity were more likely 
to be accepted in one of the rehabilitation procedures if they were  deemed as having “high 
social value” such as a large output or employment share in the economy. 
< Exit Barriers from the Cont rolling Shareholders of Failing Firms > 
Prior to the economic crisis, the controlling shareholders of failing large firms often 
sought to take shelter under court-administered rehabilitation procedures. However,  Korea’s 
inefficient bankruptcy system failed to maintain discipline in targeting appropriate firms for 
the rehabilitation procedures among an increasingly large number of financially distressed 
firms. 
The frequent abuse of the corporate reorganization procedure highlighted by several 
notorious cases involving controlling shareholders of failing firms forced the court to amend   9
the system in 1996. In particular, the court argued  for wiping out   shares held by controlling 
shareholders responsible for a  firm’s failure.  The introduction of the amendment in 1996 
produced an unintended consequence: controlling shareholders of failing firms pursued other 
means that would allow them to retain their ownership and control. Controlling shareholders 
found a loophole in the bankruptcy proceedings through the composition procedure, which 
was originally designed for small- and medium-sized  firms with  less complex  capital 
structures.  However,  before the law’s revision later,  the composition  procedure did not 
contain an  explicit limit on a firm’s size ,which enabled existing management of larger firms 
to retain control.   
 
// Table 1 here // 
 
As shown in Table 1,  there was a dramatic rise in bankruptcy  filings  for the 
composition procedure where the number of cases increased from nine cases in 1996 to 322  
in 1997,  and  728 in 1998. In the first three quarters of 1997, before the onset of the crisis, 
many  large firms on the verge of financial collapse sought to file for  bankruptcy under the 
composition  procedure.  Kia Motors was  among the many  that filed for  composition 
procedure. It deserves special attention. In  the case of Kia Motors, the debtor and creditors 
initially seeked to  file for different procedures: Kia , the debtor, initially filed for composition  10 
procedure,  but shortly thereafter creditors  decided to file for corporate reorganization. In 
cases  when  involved parties file for different proceedings as in the case of Kia Motors, 
corporate reorganization overrides a composition filing. In the end, the court accepted Kia 
Motors’ bankruptcy filing  for  corporate reorganization, but the  uncertainty  and  delay 
resulting from the  inefficient bankruptcy  system in dealing with  large failing firms  such as 
Kia Motors clearly worsened the situation of the economy.   
2.2 Post-Crisis Bankruptcy Policy Reforms 
The economic crisis of 1997  placed tremendous strain on the existing corporate 
bankruptcy system for both  in-court and  out-of-court proceedings as a result of the soaring 
number and scale of bankruptcies. Table 1 shows that the filings for judicial bankruptcy 
procedures rose dramatically in 1997. The fallout from the economic crisis on the system was 
the main driving force in implementing revisions in  the bankruptcy laws and procedures. In 
addition, the IMF and IBRD required that improvements be made in the corporate bankruptcy 
system as a condition for the bailout package.   
After the economic crisis, the Korean government  implemented reform efforts to remove 
exit barriers along two separate lines: one  involved the court-administered bankruptcy 
procedure, and the other, the pre-bankruptcy informal arrangements for corporate restructuring. 
Whereas the workout procedure had a significant impact on the corporate restructuring of larger  11 
failing firms, the court-administered  procedures focused  on the restructuring of medium-sized 
failing firms. 
In this study, we focus on policy reform in the court-administered bankruptcy system. 
Except for  small-sized firms with  less complex capital structures, the court-administered 
bankruptcy procedures would be the last resort for insolvent firms if the interested parties could 
not agree on the pre-bankruptcy informal arrangements for corporate restructuring. For pre-
bankruptcy informal arrangements, one of the most effective disciplines should come from the 
discipline of the court-administered bankruptcy procedures. In other words, during out-of-court 
informal settlements the incentives of interested parties’ would be directly affected by how they 
expect the outcome of the court-administered bankruptcy proceedings to be. 
< Bankruptcy Policy Reform in 1998: Economic Efficiency Criterion and the removal of the 
Exit Barriers for Large Firms> 
The most crucial element in the post-crisis court-administered bankruptcy system 
was the court’s establishment and tight enforcement of an economic efficiency criterion  in 
selecting qualified firms for judicial bankruptcy procedures. Instead of basing the system on 
economic efficiency, the pre-reform system was based on high social value and prospects for 
rehabilitation. Presently, a comparison of a distressed firm’s value as a going-concern with its  12 
liquidation value is required to initiate judicial bankruptcy proceedings. 
The new criterion greatly contributed to removing the de facto exit barrier placed on 
large firms that had existed in  the in-court bankruptcy system prior to the crisis. Prior to the 
crisis, producers with persistently d eclining productivity were more likely to be accepted into 
a rehabilitation procedure as long as they exhibited “high social value” such as a large output 
or employment share in the economy. 
The reforms initiated in 1998 represented the most dramatic change in the system 
since the enactment of the corporate bankruptcy laws in 1962. However, in the wake of the 
crisis,  in an effort to quickly  implement the reforms, the government was n ot successful in 
initiating a fully comprehensive revision. The shortcomings of the first reforms resulted   in 
another round of revisions in 1999. The two revisions to the bankruptcy laws significantly 
expanded the role of the courts in the corporate bankruptcy  process. If  not for the workout 
procedure introduced as an out-of-court settlement in 1998, the role of the courts would have 
been much greater.   
Besides the economic efficiency criterion, the 1998 reforms attempted to speed up 
the  proceedings. The revisions introduced  time limits for critical steps in the proceedings 
such as for the decision on stay, the report of debts and equities, the approval of the 
reorganization plan, and other related steps. Additional changes in the 1998 revision included  13 
the following: First, the reforms established mechanisms in order to induce a more active role 
for the creditors such as introducing a creditor’s conference. Second, to enhance the court’s 
capacity  to deal with a large volume of bankruptcy cases, the court receivership committee 
was introduced as a special advisor to oversee the critical steps in the proceedings. Third, the 
process of wiping out the shares of controlling shareholders was strengthened and made more 
transparent. Fourth, t o prevent the abuse of the composition procedure, some critical 
enhancements were made to the Composition Act. For example, large firms with complex 
capital structures were not allowed to file bankruptcy under the composition procedure. Table 
1 shows the impact  resulting from changes to the Composition  Act, as  the number of 
composition filings decreased sharply from 728 in 1998 to 140 in 1999. 
< Bankruptcy Policy Reform in 1999: Mandatory Liquidation System> 
Despite these significant revisions in 1998, there was room for further reform. To 
some extent, in fact, the 1999 reforms filled the gap between the initial reform proposals and 
what was finally passed in the 1998 revisions. While developing the revisions in 1999, there 
was an initial debate on the inclusion of an automatic stay provision for the new law. Under 
an automatic stay, the debtors’ assets would be automatically protected from creditors seeking 
to secure their claims. After strong arguments were presented for both sides on the issue of 
automatic stay,  the final compromise  was  to  speed up the initiation of the proceedings to  14 
within a month of the filing.   
Although the automatic stay provision can enhance the rehabilitation of failing firms 
after bankruptcy, the debtor may choose to utilize the court in order to avoid a formal default 
and thereby evade criminal punishment under the Illegal Check Control Act. According to the 
Illegal Check Control Act, the managers or controlling owners of failing firms who issued 
bad checks are criminally liable. The objective of the act was to overcome the informational 
asymmetry between debtors and creditors. Creditors faced with highly unreliable accounting 
information would be less willing to facilitate loans to debtors without a credible means of 
recourse. As a result, debtors are forced to make a credible commitment to repayment by 
risking incarceration in the case of default.  
The new revision also facilitated an efficient transition between corporate 
reorganization and liquidation. After the initiation decision, the court must compare the 
going-concern value of the firm with its liquidation value. If the liquidation value is larger 
than the g oing-concern value, the court must declare the liquidation of the firm. Donga 
Construction was liquidated in early 2001; it was the first large firm to travel down this path. 
The  mandatory liquidation  provision could be  considered  as a reform that contributes to 
enhance the efficiency of bankruptcy system.   
However, the mandatory liquidation  provision created an unintended consequence. 
The possibility of liquidation instilled fear among  failing firms  to a point where many  15 
attempted  to  avoid the judicial rehabilitation procedures. Resolving this  problem in the 
current judicial bankruptcy system remains as one of the major future policy objectives in 
Korea. 
2.3 Bankruptcy Policy Reform and the Productivity Dynamics of 
Bankruptcy Cohorts 
Firms go bankrupt due to their inability to  pay their debts. rom the perspective of 
designing a corporate bankruptcy system, a critical element is the ability to  distinguish  (or to 
elicit information on) whether an insolvent firm’s financial distress is temporary or persistent. 
One method to resolve this issue empirically is analyzing the productivity of insolvent firms. 
In the study, we construct total factor productivity measures for the firms in our data set to 
evaluate the performance of the corporate bankruptcy system  instituted after the economic 
crisis. In the analysis we examine a failing firm’s cross-sectional distribution of corporate 
bankruptcy and time series productivity pre and post bankruptcy filing. 
< Use of Bankruptcy Procedures by Chaebol Category after the Crisis > 
<Table 2 > shows the composition of  bankruptcy procedures applied to  insolvent 
firms by the chaebol category from 1997 to 1999. The table demonstrates the relative share of 
bankruptcy procedures among  insolvent firms, weighted by the size of assets. The insolvent  16 
firms in a given year include only those that went bankrupt for the first time in that year and 
excludes those from other years; hence, the table gives us the incidence of  new bankruptcies 
in the specific year. By focusing on the year cohorts, we can control for various year-specific 
effects and single out the relationship between the various rehabilitation settlements and the 
size factor over time. 
Once firms  are insolvent, they can  either  enter into  court or out-of-court 
administered settlements, including corporate reorganization, composition, or workout 
procedures. But not all firms enter into one of these rehabilitation programs; instead,  some  
are simply left bankrupt for a prolonged period of time. Firms under these circumstances are 
cut off from credit, limiting the firms to only cash transactions. 
 
// Table 2 here // 
 
<Table 2> shows the relative share of different types of settlements for new chaebol 
bankruptcies from 1997 to 1999. The firms that went bankrupt in 1997 show a clear pattern. 
For the top 30 chaebols, the majority  (94 percent in terms of asset size) was accepted into 
corporate reorganization whereas only a fraction (6 percent in terms of asset size)  was 
accepted into  composition. On the other hand, quite a significant proportion of small-sized 
chaebols entered into the composition program. A substantial portion of the independent  17 
firms (and a less substantial portion of small-sized chaebols) did not qualify for any 
rehabilitation program after bankruptcy. 
In 1 998, the government introduced an out-of-court workout procedure. < Table 2 > 
shows that, for large-sized chaebols, the workout program was the main method of settlement. 
Similarly, the workout program played an important role among independent firms. By 1999, 
the role of the workout program had  increased significantly, and most of the new 
bankruptcies (in terms of asset size) were handled  through the  out-of-court workout 
procedure. 
< Examining the Pre-Exit Productivity of Bankruptcy Cohorts > 
Note that one of the  most significant  changes in the 1998 revision was the 
introduction of the economic efficiency criterion. The  new revision required  that  the courts 
compare the going-concern value of the firm with its liquidation value for the initiation of 
judicial bankruptcy proceedings.  A preliminary  analysis  shows  the  firms that filed for 
bankruptcy  between 1998-2000 experienced less  persistent difficulties  compared  with the 
firms in 1997. For the firms filing bankruptcy in 1997,  their productivity was lower than 
solvent firms  several  years  before  they enter  into one of the rehabilitation programs. 
Rehabilitation mechanisms applied to firms under these conditions  are most likely doomed to 
failure from the start. Rehabilitation procedures must target firms that undergo bankruptcy  18 
due to temporary setbacks with the high potential for recovery. This is the case for the 1998-
2000 cohorts. The introduction of the economic efficiency criterion in 1998 appears to  have 
affected the types of  firms targeted . Note that the 1998 reform was initiated at the beginning 
of the year. 
These hypotheses can be tested statistically in the following manner. <Tables 3–4> 
show regressions of productivity on a set of dummy variables referring to  the specific year 
bankruptcy cohort interacted with the year dummy. Only the particular cohort and the group 
of solvent firms are included in each regression.  Then, the reported coefficients  mean the 
productivity differential between the  specific bankruptcy cohort and the group of solvent 
firms. 
 
//Table 3 and 4 here// 
 
<Table  3> shows that for the  1997 (corporate reorganization or composition) 
bankruptcy  cohort, the coefficients reported are negative from 1993 to 2000, and significant 
from 1995 to 2000. The 1996 bankruptcy cohort shows a similar pattern, but standard errors 
are large due to the small sample size of the 1996 cohort. On the other hand, for the pre-exit 
years of the 1998-2000 bankruptcy cohorts starting, the coefficients are small and  19 
significantly negative only around the time of bankruptcy. 
<Table 4> shows a similar  pattern of regression for the variable of profitability. The 
variable of profitability does not show a clear pattern regarding the pre-exit year productivity 
of failing firms. A possible interpretation is that some explicit or hidden subsidies given to 
failing firms at the pre-exit years  may have worked to blur the pattern of persistently 
declining productivity for the bankruptcy cohorts before the reform. 
As discussed in Section 2.2, the most  crucial element in the post-crisis court-
administered bankruptcy system was the implementation of an economic efficiency criterion. 
The court established  and tightly enforced  an economic efficiency criterion  in  selecting 
qualified failing firms for the judicial rehabilitation procedures. One of the key criteria for all 
judicial bankruptcy proceedings was to conduct a comparison of the value of a distressed firm 
as a going-concern with its liquidation value.   
Instead of economic efficiency, the  pre-reform system was based on high social 
value and prospects for rehabilitation. Note that the prospects for rehabilitation could vary 
depending on the amount of subsidies from creditors and the government. In comparison with 
the  pre-reform system, the new system removed the possibilities for interested parties (for 
example, controlling shareholders, labor union, or local /central governments) to  be in the 
way of a failing firm’s exit. In other words, the new system contributed towards removing the 
de facto exit barrier that benefited large firms under the in-court bankruptcy  system prior to  20 
the crisis. Under the new system, producers with persistently declining productivity were less 
likely to be accepted into a rehabilitation procedure regardless of whether they exhibited high 
social value such as a large output or employment share in the economy.  
III. Entry, Exit and Aggregate Productivity Growth in 
Korea Before and After the Crisis 
In the previous section, it was found that firms accepted in the court-administered 
rehabilitation program after the reform had less persistent problems in pre-bankruptcy TFP 
performance than those before the reform. We interpret this finding as a lending support to 
the argument that bankruptcy policy reform enhanced the efficiency of resource re-allocation 
after the crisis.   
Then, how is the bankruptcy policy reform likely to affect the aggregate factor of 
productivity growth? To answer this question, we discuss how the resource re-allocation by 
the competitive process of entry and exit contributes to the aggregate productivity growth 
based on evidence from the plant-level data on the Korean manufacturing sector. 
Before proceeding any further, it may be helpful to give a brief background. 
Recently, there are a growing number of studies that explore the relationship between the 
resource re-allocation process of entry and exit and aggregate TFPG, based on plant or firm  21 
level data.
3 Most studies support the point that the  process of entry and exit enhances the 
aggregate productivity by reporting at least one of the following three effects: market 
selection, learning, and “shadow of death” effects. Here, the market selection effect is the part 
of the aggregate productivity gain that comes from the fact that the efficient survive while the 
inefficient fail. The learning effect purposes that surviving entrants become relatively more 
efficient over time. Finally, the  “shadow of death” denotes the phenomenon that exiting 
plants exhibited relatively low productivity performance several years earlier.4 
Then, can we expect that the same forces are at work in Korea’s case? To answer 
this question, we discuss below what the actual patterns of plant entry and exit have been and 
whether the plant turnovers reflect productivity differential among plants, based on Hahn 
(2000).
5 
<Patterns of Plant Entry and Exit in the Korean Manufacturing Industry> 
In Hahn (2000), there are two types of entry—birth and switch-in. Birth is defined 
as a plant that first appears in the data set. Switch -in is a plant that existed in a market in the 
previous period which is different from its current one. Here, a market is defined as a five-
                                                                   
3  For a recent survey of the empirical literature in this vein, see Tybout (1996a), Caves (1998), and Foster, 
Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001). 
4  With regard to the question of how much of the aggregate productivity growth is accounted for by entry and 
exit, however, the available evidence seems mixed. For example, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) on the 
U.S., and Aw, Chen, and Roberts (2001) on Taiwan report large role of entry and exit in aggregate productivity 
growth while Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992) on the U.S., and Griliches and Regev (1995) on Israel find a 
minor role.   
5  For more detailed discussion, see Hahn (2000).   22 
digit level industry. A continuing plant is the one that is neither identified as birth nor switch-
in. Similarly, there are two types of exit—death and swi tch-out. Death is defined as a plant 
that disappears from the data set in the next period, while switch-out is a plant which moves 
out to another market in the next period. Under these working definitions, the actual patterns 
of entry and exit can be documented.   
<Table 5> and <Table 6> show the percentage contribution of plant births and 
deaths, respectively, in terms of output and number of plants. Specifically, table 5 illustrates 
what fraction of output or number of plants for each year is attributable to the plants which 
are grouped by plant age. Table 6 shows similar statistics for each year by group of plants that 
will die within a certain time period. Overall, the figures below suggest that the plant 
turnover rate was quite high in the Korean manufacturing industry during the 1990-98 period.   
According to Table 5, plants less than five years of age account for more than 25 
percent  of manufacturing production except for the crisis year of 1998. In 1998, the 
contribution from plants aged less than five years declines sharply to 21.5 percent. This 
decline is attributable not only to a fall in the birth rate but also to a rise in the closing of 
young plants, reflecting the severe recession. In terms of plant number, the importance of 
births becomes more p ronounced; one to five-year-old plants account for about 65 percent of 
the total for each year, except for 1998. The larger contribution of young aged plants in terms 
of plant number indicates the relatively small size of those plants.  23 
 
// Table 5 and 6 here // 
 
The new plant entry rate in Korea seems to be higher than most other countries for 
which similar studies are available. While plants aged less than five years account for about 
25 percent of a given year’s output in Korea, they explain 13.6 to 18.5  percent in the U.S., 
18.3 to 20.8 percent in Colombia, and 15.0 to 15.7 percent in Chile, depending on the year.
6 
Comparison of entry rate between Korea and Taiwan might be useful since, even though both 
countries were equally dynamic countries, these countries differed vastly in their industrial 
structure. That is, it is well known that Korea relied heavily on Chaebols, while Taiwan on 
small and medium sized enterprises, in their past economic success. If Chaebols in Korea 
employed a more capital intensive production structure requiring larger sunk setup costs than 
SMEs in Taiwan, then it could well be conjectured that this condition, combined with policy -
related exit barriers, worked as an entry barrier, lowering entry rate in Korea. Consistent with 
this hypothesis, the entry rate in Korea reported by Hahn (2000) seems to be less pronounced 
compared with Taiwan. In a similar study for Taiwan, Aw, Chen, and Roberts (2001) report 
that one to five-year-old firms account for approximately one-third to one-half  of the 
                                                                   
6  See Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988) for the U.S., Roberts (1996) and Tybout (1996b) for Colombia 
and Chile, respectively. The figure for the U.S. is based on firm level data.  24 
production in nine Taiwanese manufacturing industries in 1991
7. However, further study is 
required to shed more light on this issue. 
The plant death rate is also high in the Korean manufacturing industry, which is not 
surprising given the high cross sectional correlation between the entry and exit rates reported 
in the literature. Although there are some variations over the years, about 20 percent of the 
plants in terms of output and more than half of the plants in terms of plant number cease to 
exist within a span of five years. In 1993, the contribution of the plants that will die within 
five years became significantly larger reflecting the severe economic recession in 1998. The 
contribution of plant deaths in terms of plant number is much larger than in terms of output, 
indicating that the deaths are concentrated among the smaller plants. 
The plant death conditional on birth (not reported) is even higher than the 
unconditional death rates reported above. In terms of both plant number and output, the death 
rate conditional on births is much higher than the unconditional death rate especially during 
the first three years of operation. Thus, new plants seem to fail easily especially during the 
first three years. This might be due, among other factors, to the low productivity of births on 
average during the early stages of operation, which seems consistent with the theories of firm 
dynamics such as Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhyn (1992). Switch-ins and switch-outs (not 
                                                                   
7  Unfortunately, a direct comparison of the two studies could be somewhat misleading because Hahn (2000) 
used plant-level data while Aw, Chen, and Roberts (2001) used firm level data. Nevertheless, relatively high 
entry rate in Taiwan seems to be a robust conclusion since entry rate measured at plant level would be higher 
than at firm level in so far as there are multi-plant firms.   25 
reported) are also frequently observed in the Korean manufacturing sector. In terms of output, 
they are almost as important as births or deaths, respectively. Compared with births or deaths, 
switch-ins or switch-outs are generally bigger in size.   
<Productivity Differential Among Plant Groups At a Point in Time> 
Having described the plant entry and exit rates in the Korean manufacturing sector, 
we proceed to the issue of whether plant turnovers reflect certain patterns of productivity 
differential. For this purpose, we first examine the relationship between plant turnover 
patterns and plant productivity, both at a point in time and over a period of time.
8 Below, we 
discuss the former aspect of the study.   
<Table 7> compares the unweighted mean productivity levels of plants that exist in a 
given  year, by five plant groups defined as earlier. Main findings could be summarized as 
follows. First, deaths in a given year are, on average, less productive than continuing plants in 
that year. Depending on the year, they are about 3 to 6 percent less productive than 
continuing plants. This result is consistent with the prediction by models of plant or firm 
heterogeneity that market selection forces sort out low-productivity plants from high-
productivity plants.   
 
                                                                   
8  Plant productivity level is measured according to chained-multilateral index number approach as developed in 
Good (1985) and Good, Nadiri, and Sickles (1997) and employed in Aw, Chen, and Roberts (2001). For details,  26 
// Table 7 here // 
 
Second, births are on av erage less productive than continuing plants in the first year 
they are observed. They are even less productive than deaths. In fact, the productivity of a 
typical birth plant is the lowest among all groups of plants in every year. Initial low 
productivity of birth plants relative to continuing plants or deaths is not consistent with the 
presence of the simple vintage effect that new plants are more productive than older plants. 
However, it is not necessarily contradictory to the prediction of several recent models of plant 
dynamics, such as Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992). Potential entrants who are 
uncertain about their productivity but hold a positive outlook on their post-entry productivity 
performance—i.e., who expect they could catch up with the  incumbents in terms of 
productivity sooner or later—may enter despite their initially low productivity. Of course, 
birth plants themselves are also heterogeneous in terms of productivity, as will be discussed 
later. 
The initial low productivity level of births relative to incumbents is also documented 
by other studies, although these studies differ from ours in data and methodologies. For 
example, Aw, Chen, and Roberts (2001) reports that entrants in 1986 are between 0.6 percent 
and 6.9 percent less productive than incumbent firms depending on industry, using firm level 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
see Hahn (2000).    27 
data on Taiwanese manufacturing industries. Meanwhile, Table 10 in Foster, Haltiwanger, and 
Krizan (2001) reports that there is no statistical difference between continuing plants and 
entering plants in terms of multifactor productivity in 1987, based on ten-year interval 
analysis of plant level data on U.S. manufacturing sector. However, the same table illustrates 
that the cohort of plants that entered during the past five-year period, rather than ten-year 
period, show lower productivity than continuing plants in 1987.9   
Third, switch-in or switch -out plants have higher productivity than birth or death, 
respectively. The productivity of those plants is roughly comparable to the continuing plants 
on average. Higher productivity of switch-ins relative to births is consistent with the idea that 
having experience in a related market is beneficial. Also, the finding that switch-outs have 
productivity levels comparable to continuing plants seems to suggest that high productivity 
plants possesses mobility. Finally, each new cohort of births are more productive than their 
previous cohorts. This finding conforms well with the presumption of recent R&D-based 
endogenous growth models, such as Grossman and Helpman (1991), in that potential entrants 
receives externality from previous innovation.  
The above findings suggest that plant turnovers, especially entry by birth and exit by 
death, are not random events. In other words, the productivity of birth and death plants are 
more likely to be located at the lower end of the productivity distribution. In particular, lower 
                                                                   
9  They report, however, that in terms of labor productivity entering plants have lower productivity than  28 
productivity of deaths relative to continuing plants indicates that market selection forces are 
at work as predicted by theoretical models of plant or firm dynamics. Market selection of low 
productivity plants from surviving high productivity plants is a process that enhances the 
aggregate level productive efficiency.  
Lower productivity of births relative to continuing plants or even death is not 
inconsistent with the prediction of theoretical models and often found for other countries. 
However, it could cast doubt on the positive role of exit and entry on the aggregate efficiency 
gain. That is, it suggests that the instantaneous effect of resource reallocation by plant deaths 
and births on aggregate productivity growth might be very small or even negative, which 
might be true especially if the resources released by deaths are entirely reallocated to births. 
Is this the end of the story? The answer is no. To further understand this point, we now 
discuss the dynamic aspects of the relationship between plant turnovers and productivity. 
Specifically, we discuss post-entry and pre-exit performance of plants by focusing on market 
selection, learning, and shadow of death effects. 
<Post-Entry Performance: Market Selection and Learning> 
To proceed, we utilize the longitudinal aspect of the data set to examine whether 
market selection forces sort out low productivity plants among birth plants. In our sample, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
continuing plants even at ten year intervals.  29 
there are eight cohorts of births according to birth year from 1991 to 1998. Focusing on a 
particular birth-year cohort has the advantage of controlling the possible age effect on 
survival. For example, we examine whether plants that belong to the 1991 birth cohort but die 
in 1993 have lower productivity at the time of death compared with the other surviving 
members of the birth cohort. To do so, plant productivity is regressed on a set of year 
dummies (not reported) and a dummy variable denoting whether the plant died after birth 
within the sample period interacted with year dummies. Thus, the estimated coefficients 
denote the productivity differential between deaths and survivors at the time of death. The 
regression results for three birth cohorts are reported in <Table 8>. 
The table shows that, for each birth-year cohort reported, exiting plants demonstrate 
significantly lower productivity than surviving plants at the time of death. Depending on the 
cohort year or death year, deaths are less productive than surviving plants by about 3 to 6 
percent. Thus, the evidence from the Korean manufacturing sector clearly supports the 
presence of a market selection effect: market forces sort out plants on the basis of 
productivity.   
 
// Table 8 here // 
 
As noted by Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001), the entry and exit process  30 
contributes to aggregate productivity growth also through rapid learning of surviving entrants. 
In the Korean manufacturing sector, the learning effect is also observed. To illustrate the 
point, let us examine the productivity performance of the surviving members of the births 
relative to continuing plants. <Figure 1> shows the average productivity of birth cohorts that 
survived until 1998 by birth year, in comparison with continuing plants i n 1991 that also 
survived until 1998. Continuing plants have increased their productivity steadily and 
improved their average productivity by about 23 percent during the 1991-98 period. Each 
birth-year cohort starts with a productivity disadvantage relative to continuing plants at the 
year of entry. However, every birth cohort exhibits a very rapid improvement in productivity 
following entry, and catches up with continuing plants in terms of productivity level after 
several years. The initial productivity differential between births and continuing plants ranges 
from 6 to 10 percent depending on the birth year. In the following year after entry, the 
productivity differential narrows to only about 0 to 3 percent. In the third year after entry, the 
productivity level of births is roughly the same as, or even slightly higher than, continuing 
plants. The 1991 birth cohort in particular, which has the longest time series, maintains a 
higher average productivity than continuing plants three years after entry. Thus, the results 
are clearly supportive of the presence of a rapid learning effect by surviving members of 
births, especially during the first several years after entry.   
  31 
// Figure 1 here // 
 
<Pre-Exit Productivity Performance of Deaths: “Shadow of Death” Effect> 
In order to understand the connection between the micro process of entry and exit 
and the aggregate productivity growth, it would be ideal if we could examine the 
counterfactual phenomenon of what would have happened to the productivity performance of 
deaths if they had not died. Unfortunately, this seems to be an impossible task. However, it 
could prove to be beneficial to examine pre-death productivity performance of deaths in order 
to formulate an idea on the counterfactual. The issue is whether plant deaths reflect a random 
or transitory event or a persistently bad productivity performance record.  
<Figure 2> shows the time series of the average productivity of plants that existed in 
1990 grouped by the year of death in comparison with plants that survived throughout the 
sample period. There are two points to be noted here. First, there is a significant productivity 
gap not only at the time of death but also in the years preceding death between each death 
cohort and the group that survived until 1998, even though each death cohort experienced 
absolute productivity gain over time. This phenomenon suggests that plant deaths reflect 
underlying productivity differences that have existed for a long period of time. In other words,  32 
those differences are not just a result of a random or transitory event. To take an example of 
the 1997 death cohort, the productivity disadvantage relative to the surviving group is about 
6.5 percent in 1997. However, the productivity differential dates back as early as 1990 when 
it is as large as 3.7 percent already. Similar results hold for other death cohorts. Thus, plant 
deaths seem to reflect not only a disadvantage in productivity at a point in time but also 
persistently poor history of productivity. 10   
 
// Figure 2 here // 
 
Second, the productivity differential between deaths and surviving plants tends to 
widen, especially during the periods nearing the death year. For example, in the 1997 death 
cohort, the productivity differential fluctuates between 3.5 and 4.7 percent during 1990-96 
period, but in 1997 it rises to 6.5 percent. Similar patterns are found for other death-year 
cohorts. 
So far we examined the pre-death productivity performance of death cohorts relative 
to surviving groups of plants and observed large and persistent productivity differences. The 
disparities often widen over time during the period near the death year. However, such large 
and persistent productivity differences observed in Figure 2 might reflect other uncontrolled 
                                                                   
10  Hahn (2000) shows that these results are largely intact from the industry composition effect.  33 
factors that differ between survivors and deaths, such as plant age. That is, younger plants 
may be less productive and suffer death more frequently than older plants. In order to control 
for this possible age effect on productivity and survival, we also looked at the pre-death 
performance of plants that are born in the same year. 
<Figure 3> shows pre-death productivity of a 1991 birth cohort that is further 
divided by the death year, in comparison with the 1991 births that survived until 1998. For 
comparison, the productivity performance of 1991 continuing plants that survived until 1998 
is also shown. As expected, the persistence of productivity differential among 1991 births is 
somewhat less pronounced than suggested by Figure 2. The 1991 births that dies before 1998 
do not demonstrate a noticeable productivity disadvantage in the early years of operation 
compared with the surviving group. Especially in the first year of operation, which is 1991, 
there is virtually no productivity differential among them, except 1996 deaths. Moreover, for 
several years following entry, the productivity differential between the 1991 births and 
the1991 continuing (and surviving until 1998) plants narrows over time.   
 
// Figure 3 here // 
 
However, as surviving members of 1991 births improve their productivity at a faster 
rate, productivity gap begins to develop and persists over time. In addition, for each death- 34 
year cohort among the 1991 births, the productivity disadvantage relative to the continuing 
group becomes the largest in the last year they are observed. Thus, even if the possible age 
effect on productivity and survival is controlled for, plant deaths still reflect somewhat 
persistent productivity disadvantage that often widens during the period near death. 
These findings seem to suggest that plant deaths reflect persistently poor 
productivity performance which often worsens near the death year. In other words, low 
productivity of deaths is not just an outcome of random or transitory events. 
<Entry, Exit and Aggregate TFPG > 
The empirical evidence presented above is summarized as follows. Overall, plant deaths 
reflect persistently low productivity in the past. Entering plants may initially begin with a relatively 
low productivity level, but over time, they go through the process of market selection: the inefficient 
fail and the efficient survive. The surviving entrants experience a rapid learning and become highly 
efficient over time.   
This pattern of productivity dynamics suggests that the major effect from the resource 
reallocation of entry and exit on aggregate productivity will emerge over time even though the 
instantaneous gain may be small or even negative. The evidence also suggests that policies that inhibit 
the resource reallocation process of entry and exit of businesses are likely to be inefficient. In 
particular, although the cost of such policies may not appear immediately, it will materialize and grow  35 
over time in the form of foregone aggregate productivity gain. Alternatively, policies that improve the 
efficiency of resource reallocation, such a s bankruptcy policy reform, may not improve aggregate 
total factor productivity instantaneously. However, the benefits from such policies will most likely to 
be realized over time. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
This study has found that failing firms, accepted in  court-administered rehabilitation 
procedures after the bankruptcy reforms, had less persistent problems in pre-bankruptcy TFP 
performance compared  with those before the reforms. We interpreted this finding as lending 
support to the argument that bankruptcy policy reform improved the efficiency of resource re-
allocation after the crisis.   
Then, to get an idea of h ow the bankruptcy policy reform would affect the 
performance of aggregate TFP, we examined how the resource reallocation by the 
competitive process of entry and exit had contributed to aggregate productivity growth based 
on evidence from plant level data on the Korean manufacturing sector. The empirical analysis 
supports that, in Korea, exiting producers exhibit persistently declining productivity while 
entering producers that survive the market selection process show rapidly increasing 
productivity. These  specific patterns of productivity dynamics suggests that policies that  36 
prevent resources from being reallocated efficiently via entry and exit could potentially be 
very costly with the cost growing over time. Conversely, bankruptcy policy reform, which 
induces inefficient firms to exit and allocates the released resources to efficient entrants or 
incumbents, would contribute to increasing the rate of aggregate productivity growth. 
  37 
¦  Appendix: Data 
1.  Productivity Dynamics of Distressed Firms in Korea in Section  
(1) firm-level productivity measure 
We use d etailed financial information on the firms that have external audit reports. 
According to the Act on External Audit of Joint-Stock Corporations, a firm with assets of 7 
billion won or more must issue audited financial statements. The data thus includes all the 
firms with assets of 7 billion won or more. For this data, firm productivity is estimated using 
the chained-multilateral index number approach.  
(2)  data on bankruptcy filings by distressed firms 
The information on corporate bankruptcy was gathered from various sources such as 
the Courts, Financial Supervisory Service and the Bank of Korea. 
2.  Plant Productivity in Korean Manufacturing Sector in Section  
The data used for this section comes from the unpublished plant-level database 
underlying the Annual Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey. The data covers all 
plants with five or more employees in 580 manufacturing industries at five digit level. It is an 
unbalanced panel data with about 60,000 to 90,000 plants for each year during the 1990-98 
period, so that the total number of observations is about 700,000. For details in measurement  38 
of plant total productivity, see Hahn (2000).  39 
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Table 1. Bankruptcy Filings before and after the Crisis 




1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  20021) 


































































 Note: 1) from January to October. 
       2) Numbers in parentheses denote the percentage. 
 Source: Supreme Court of Korea 
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Table 2. Insolvent Firms’ Procedure by the Chaebol Category 
(unit: trillion won, %) 
1997  1998  1999 























0.35  0.61  9.48  0.09983  0  0  5.669  0  0  0  3.455  1-30 
Largest 
Chaebols  (3.38)  (5.80)  (90.82)  (1.73)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (98.27)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (100) 
0  0  0.19  0  0  0  5.713  0  0  0  0.5862  31-60 
Largest 
Chaebols  (0.00)  (0.00)  (100)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (100)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (100) 
3.18  7.69  12.67  0.7850  1.560  6.795  13.05  0  1.081  0.2857  14.71  61-300 
Largest 
Chaebols  (13.51)  (32.66)  (53.84)  (3.54)  (7.03)  (30.62)  (58.81)  (0.00)  (6.73)  (1.78)  (91.50) 





ent Firms  
(29.16)  (9.73)  (61.11)  (24.44)  (19.16)  (17.18)  (39.22)  (1.69)  (3.29)  (1.47)  (93.55) 
Notes: 1) The frequencies are weighted by the asset size. 
2) Author’s calculation for all the firms in the NICE data. 
3) Numbers in parentheses denote the percentage. 
Source: Youngjae Lim (2003)   45 
Table 3. Productivity Dynamics of Bankruptcy Cohorts before and after Bankruptcy Policy Reform 
(Firms undergoing Corporate Reorganization or Composition) 
Dependent Variable: Productivity  Independent variables: 
Dummy Variable Denoting a Specific 
Cohort Interacted with Year and Industry 
Dummy  (1)For the 1996 Cohort  (2)For the 1997 Cohort  (3)For the 1998 Cohort  (4)For the 1999 Cohort  (5)For the 2000 Cohort 
















































































Year Dummies Included  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies Included  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations  40,205  40,476  41,025  40,588  40,373 
 Notes: 1) Numbers in the parenthesis are standard errors. 
       2) *  significant at the 10% significance level 
         ** significant at the 5% significance level   46 
Table 4. Profitability Performance of the Bankruptcy Cohorts before and after Bankruptcy Policy Reform 
(Firms undergoing Corporate Reorganization or Composition) 
Dependent Variable: Profitability  Independent variables: 
Dummy Variable Denoting a Specific 
Cohort Interacted with Year and Industry 
Dummy  (1)For the 1996 Cohort  (2)For the 1997 Cohort  (3)For the 1998 Cohort  (4)For the 1999 Cohort  (5)For the 2000 Cohort 


























































































Year Dummies Included  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies Included  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations  52,026  52,345  53,031  52,520  52,236 
Notes: 1) Numbers in the parenthesis are standard errors. 
      2) *  significant at the 10% significance level 
        ** significant at the 5% significance level 47 
Table 5. Contribution of Plant Births 
(Unit: %) 
Under 5 years  Over 5 years 

















1995  53.32  17.13  14.22   9.09  67.54  26.22  32.46  73.78 
1996  47.60  15.36  18.68  11.11  66.29  26.46  33.71  73.54 
1997  45.40  14.77  18.67  10.63  64.08  25.40  35.92  74.60 
1998  39.45  12.77  18.63   8.68  58.08  21.45  41.92  78.55 
Source: Hahn (2000) 
 
Table 6.  Contribution of Plant Deaths 
(Unit: %) 
Within 5 years 
1-3  4-5  Total 



















1990  36.85  13.36  15.71  6.48  52.57  19.85  47.43  80.15 
1991  37.41  14.52  17.11  7.62  54.52  22.14  45.48  77.86 
1992  39.28  15.08  16.72  7.77  56.00  22.85  44.00  77.15 
1993  43.71  14.92  20.23  9.13  63.93  24.05  36.07  75.95 
 Source: Hahn (2000)  48 
Table 7. Average Productivity of Plant Groups, 1990-1998 
Entry  Exit  Total 
  Continuing 
Birth  Switch in  Death  Switch out   
1990  -0.005      -0.044  -0.026  -0.016 
1991  0.046  -0.031  0.041  -0.003  0.050  0.026 
1992  0.061  -0.005  0.061  0.018  0.068  0.046 
1993  0.087  0.030  0.096  0.051  0.101  0.072 
1994  0.132  0.056  0.141  0.101  0.144  0.118 
1995  0.190  0.132  0.199  0.150  0.202  0.174 
1996  0.197  0.143  0.208  0.160  0.214  0.185 
1997  0.239  0.177  0.252  0.182  0.245  0.218 
1998  0.256  0.200  0.267      0.249 
 Note: Unweighted averages. 
 Source: Hahn (2000) 
 
 
Table 8.  Market Selection among Birth Cohorts 
 
Births 1991  Births 1993  Births 1995 
Deaths 1992     -0.065 
   (0.005)     
Deaths 1993 
   -0.044 
   (0.004)     
Deaths 1994 
   -0.036 
   (0.004) 
   -0.042 
   (0.003)   
Deaths 1995     -0.032 
   (0.004) 
   -0.032 
   (0.003)   
Deaths 1996 
   -0.048 
   (0.004) 
   -0.030 
   (0.003) 
   -0.053 
   (0.003) 
Deaths 1997 
   -0.038 
   (0.003) 
   -0.044 
   (0.002) 
   -0.039 
   (0.002) 
 Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
 Source: Hahn (2000) 
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  Source: Hahn (2000) 
 

































































Source: Hahn (2000) 
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